Catherine L. Booth and Ivy Hamerly. “Democratization through Depoliticization: Bureaucratic Authoritarian Regimes and Their Path to Democracy.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Christians in Political Science Association, Waco TX, June 10, 2016.
Abstract: Are some forms of authoritarian regimes more likely to experience a lasting democratization than other forms of authoritarianism? This paper argues that some forms of authoritarianism are more capable of building state capacity than others. Bureaucratic authoritarian (BA) regimes draw legitimacy from the provision of order and economic performance, which leads these regimes to build up state capacity. Rather than rushing countries into fragile electoral democracies, perhaps slower transitions that occur after countries have built up state capacity would lead to more democratic consolidation and persistence.
American Political Science Association Presentations
Hamerly, Ivy. “Parliamentary Heterogeneity and Oversight of the EU” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the APSA 2008 Annual Meeting, Hynes Convention Center, Boston, Massachusetts, Aug 28, 2008 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p278792_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Drawing from research in Economics, Sociology and Political Science that has shown that diversity makes cooperation more difficult, this paper argues that one way a heterogeneous group can achieve cooperation is through formal oversight mechanisms. In European Union member states, one policy area where cooperation is essential is in the oversight of European affairs. Many policy decisions previously made by democratically elected national legislatures in Europe are now decided through the EUs policymaking process. National legislatures responded to this change by establishing oversight committees in European Affairs. While all national legislatures of EU member states have European Affairs Committees, there is considerable variation in the institutional designs of these committees. Using exact logistic regression to test several competing explanations on cross-national data from 25 European democracies, this article finds that the more political parties there are in a legislature, the more likely that legislature will establish a European Affairs Committee with the power to issue binding recommendations to guide cabinet ministers negotiations at the Council of the European Union.Hamerly, Ivy. “A Matter of Timing: National Legislatures and the Oversight of the European Union” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007Online <PDF>. 2012-04-06 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p208774_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper explores the effects of European integration on national level legislatures in European Union member states. Many economic and political decisions previously made by democratically elected national legislatures are now decided at a supranational, or European, level. National legislatures have responded to this change by increasing their oversight of European affairs in order to impose more democratic accountability and transparency into the opaque decision-making process of developing European legislation. While all national legislatures of European Union member states have established European Affairs Committees to help strengthen oversight of European affairs, there is considerable variation in the institutional strength and political control invested in these committees. I argue that the more recently a country joined the European Union, the more likely its European Affairs Committee will have the power to issue binding recommendations to the government. Cross-sectional statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the timing of membership and a legislature’s approach to parliamentary oversight of European affairs.Hamerly, Ivy. “Contested Sovereignty: From Religious Norms to Institutional Design in Parliamentary Oversight of European Union Affairs” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott Wardman Park, Omni Shoreham, Washington Hilton, Washington, DC, Sep 01, 2005 Online <APPLICATION/PDF>. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41330_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper traces the progression from religious norms to institutional design in European national parliaments. Ideas from the Protestant Reformation shape attitudes toward supranational organizations, which affect parliamentary responses to the EU. There is a strong correlation between the percentage of Roman Catholics or Orthodox Christians in a country and the strength of national parliamentary scrutiny of European Union affairs. My explanation for this correlation between religion and parliamentary scrutiny points to the different attitudes to the nation-state found in Christian Democratic parties in Europe. I trace the origins of these attitudes from religious norms and then explain how these norms lead to variation in institutional design. Countries where the Christian Democratic Party draws on roots that are predominantly Roman Catholic tend to have a more skeptical attitude to the nation-state and are more willing to yield sovereignty to a supranational authority. Countries where the Reformation was imposed from the top-down have Christian Democratic parties that are historically dominated by Protestants and are guided by ideas found in Protestant political thought, such as a rejection of political universalism and reliance on the nation-state for protection from homogenization. These countries tend to have strong parliamentary scrutiny of European Affairs. Countries that experienced the Reformation from the bottom-up tend to have Christian Democratic parties that include both Protestants and Catholics. These countries are more ambivalent in their attitudes to the nation-state and tend to have moderate levels of parliamentary scrutiny.Orr, Ivy. “Competing Agents in Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union: National Governments and European Affairs Committees” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA,Aug 27, 2003 Online <.PDF>. <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p64648_index.html>
Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: How do national parliaments regain some of their influence over policy areas that have been lost to the European Union? National parliaments influence policy as it travels upstream to the intergovernmental level or in the downstream implementation process. This paper presents a model that demonstrates how national parliaments could strengthen their influence over European policy in the upstream stage by minimizing information asymmetries with their representative at the European level, the national government. The containment of agency losses in the upstream process is a necessary step toward regaining policy influence, but it is not sufficient. Downstream influence is also necessary. This paper uses principal-agent theory to explain why national parliaments establish European Affairs Committees (EAC) and illustrate EAC limitations. It presents a model for the strategic interaction between national parliaments and governments over European policy. The conclusion describes possible empirical tests of the model and gives suggestions for future research.