Political trust is essential to sustain democratic government and one enduring puzzle in the study of American public opinion is what explains the decline in citizens’ trust in government since the late 1960s. We contribute to the study of trust by examining a factor that has received little attention to date: the adoption of state public sector collective bargaining laws. We theorize that the widescale unionization of public employees is likely to negatively impact trust in government because it leads to a decline in political authority, accountability, and government responsiveness. Using American National Election Studies data to measure citizens’ trust in government consistently over time, we leverage differences in the timing by which states adopted collective bargaining laws for public sector workers across a variety of occupations (state employees, local employees, teachers, police officers, and firefighters). We find consistent evidence that citizens report lower levels of trust in government after their state adopts public sector collective bargaining and this finding is robust to a variety of subsample analyses and timing and placebo checks. Notably, we also find a similar effect when assessing 1972-1976 ANES panel data, a timeframe when several states enacted these laws. Our findings have important implications for our understanding of the decline in citizens’ trust in government as well as changing the focus of the literature on public sector unions that, to date, has almost exclusively emphasized economic impacts.
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Did Trump Do Better Where Inflation Was Worse? Evidence from County-Level Data
Popular media accounts of the 2024 U.S. presidential election contend that inflation played a decisive role in Donald Trump’s victory over Kamala Harris. The limited scholarly studies conducted so far on the election also suggest that concerns about inflation and higher prices were key drivers of voters’ decision-making. However, these studies rely exclusively on voters’ perceptions of inflation whereas, to date, there has not been an analysis of whether Trump did better in areas where inflation was objectively worse. Using existing data sources to calculate a measure of price increases at the county level leading up to the election, I assess whether Trump performed better (relative to the 2020 election) in counties where inflation was higher. I find consistent evidence that Trump’s vote share improved more where inflation was higher (a one standard deviation change in the inflation measure across counties predicts a 0.1 to 0.3 increase in vote share). Notably, in subsample analyses, I also find that the effect of inflation on Trump’s performance is particularly pronounced in lower income counties where the pain of higher prices was likely most acutely felt by voters. In short, this paper presents compelling evidence that Trump performed better in counties where inflation was objectively higher and provides further support that high prices were a driving factor for the outcome of the 2024 presidential election.