Category Archives: Plato

A last post

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I’d like to thank my philosophy compatriots for being so welcoming to someone from another discipline. I imagine it must have been burdensome to have a student who wasn’t familiar with some basic concepts trying to get in on the conversation.

Generally, the class has increased my admiration of Plato tremendously. I knew he was a tremendous writer before this semester, but recently I have felt only complete astonishment at his capabilities. It is truly a pleasure to encounter such a great mind through such beautiful prose, and my soul is the better for it.

I think one of the chief things I learned is that there is no such thing as a truly aporetic dialogue. Although the characters may never give an explicit answer to a question, the dialogue itself, as a whole, does give an answer. It may not be a full answer, and perhaps cannot be easily formulated into a proposition, but nonetheless, Plato still offers truth and a way out of ignorance. As Cleanth Brooks once said, we shoudn’t try to reduce poetry to a single statement; to do such is the “heresy of paraphrase.” I think something similar is the case with Plato’s dialogues. The easily abstracted propositions are not the only important parts of Plato’s writing, because they belong to a much larger whole. The whole itself is a sort of experience, and it is that experience that we can be sure the writer meant for us to go through. It is that experience which helps us become better human beings and answers the questions Socrates perpetually puts to his interlocutors.

Thanks for a great semester, and God bless.

S

Parmenides

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Dr. Schultz asked us to question why Parmenides pushes Socrates as he does, that is question the ability of forms to answer how things can be both one and many at the same time. We are especially supposed to keep Parmenides’ poem is mind, and the philosophy he teaches therein.

What is Parmenides’ beginning, inasmuch as such a thing is knowable from his poem? He emphasizes the tremendous importance of being, and that philosophy and thought are ultimately of what is rather than what is not. It is uncreated and indestructible, because such things would involve a change, either from nonbeing to being or being to nonbeing. Ultimately, it seems that Parmenides makes the same argument about any sort of limitation or definition concerning being. There are no parts within in his cosmos, there is no beginning of being nor end of being, no time, no shape, no place. There is nothing that most people would think belongs to the natural world.

Why then does he object to Socrates and the forms? I’m not at all sure, but I imagine it would have something to do with introducing some element of nonbeing into being, which Parmenides sees as contradictory. The main difficulty I have with Parmenides’ assault on Socrates is that it seems that the poet-philosopher is at war with predication and thus the intelligibility of the world. Does he see predication as erroneous because predication necessarily involves parts, which means that being can be said in more than one way? Is Parmenides sacrificing the knowability of the world for the sake of being? Is attempting to hold the whole in one’s mind only at the expense of particularity and even speech?

Obviously, none of these comments deal with Parmenides’ attack on the forms, and his arguments’ logical validity. I’m trying to understand the motivation behind the attempted refutations. We should not think that Parmenides is trying to refute the forms purely because he finds the idea of a subsistent idea vexing – he is coming from a particular background and has a particular agenda.

Post Parmenides thoughts

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Our first class on Parmenides was very impressive. I thought Alina and Allie did excellent jobs elucidating some of Parmenides’ problems with Socrates’ attempt to describe how there can be one and many.

I am still a bit confused why there are so many references to Republic at the beginning of the dialogue. It seems that Plato is hitting his reader over the head with the references, and I think it must be some sort of key to understanding the dialogue. One thing that comes to mind is the character of philosophy. One of the consistent moves that Socrates makes in Republic is making one out of many. He often makes the move of claiming that a universal, a mental being, exists in reality. This is the basis for his questionable reasoning which especially comes out in book 5. I wonder if there is something of Parmenides in Socrates’ arguments in Republic; an attempt to simplify the complexity of the world into logical beings for the sake of easier argumentation , or at least more graspable concepts.

Just a thought. If such were the case, I think we might see references to Parmenides at the beginning of Republic rather than the other way around. That suggests that we ought to keep the Republic in mind for Parmenides; maybe we are meant to see in Parmenides the reasons we may have been uncomfortable with the images of politics and philosophy in Republic.

Strangeness in Parmenides

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It seems that I can never get past the first few lines of a dialogue before I’m utterly beset by question. Normally, that might be a good thing, but I fear that at this point I may simply be not “getting it”. Once again, I’m confused by the presentation and the oddness of the narration.

Firstly, I think it’s very odd that the speaker is called Cephalus. Is it our old defender of justice from Repbulic? Probably not. At the same time, the first two people we meet by name in the narration are Glaucon and Adeimantus. If this is not the Cephalus we know and may or may not love, we surely must be thinking of him; the juxtaposition of the name demands such association.  I don’t think that this is the same Cephalus of Republic, if for no other reason than the familiarity of the two brothers when the speak to our narrator.  Nonetheless, the similarity of the name cannot be insignificant. What are we to make of the name?

Furthermore, why is Antiphon presented such as he is? Adeimantus says that he recited the story of Parmenides over and over. He has the entire thing memorized, and we are meant to notice this given Cephalus’ bad memory (126b). Nonetheless, apparently he shucked off the philosophic life for taking care of horses. Is this laudable?

Did Antophon find the meeting of Socrates and Parmenides to be too much? If so, does this make us question the effectiveness of Parmenides as a teacher? The introduction claims that Parmenides is the “spokesman” of Plato in this dialogue. I wonder if the life of Antiphon might make us question that assessment.

 

final thoughts on Theatetus

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Dr. Schultz wondered at the end of class whether we were happy with Socrates being as indirect as he is. Is it really helpful to only aid someone else in bringing forth their thoughts and ideas, without attempting to form those ideas or thoughts? This, as far as I can tell, was the nature of the question.

On the one hand, it seems absolutely appropriate. However much Socrates argues against the notion that perception is knowledge, he does seem to think knowledge rest on experience a great deal. Without personal experience, there can be no knowledge. Thus the perception of the would-be knower is very important; it’s the stuff knowledge is made of. Because the would-be knower is so intimately tied to what he knows, it not only be inappropriate for Socrates to intrude with a doctrine, but it would be impossible. In fact, it might even kill whatever chance his interlocutor had at knowing something.

On the other hand, why couldn’t he say as much to his interlocutors? He could explain that knowing takes time and experience, and can’t be gained immediately just by listening to someone. The interlocutor could then at least be a little self-aware regarding Socrates’ project.

These are probably just the same concerns of Dr. Schultz put in other words. I think that I would prefer Socrates to be a little more up front about his project, beyond simply claiming ignorance I mean. I sort of wonder if Plato, by apparently not following in his mentor’s footsteps, had similar reservations.

More thoughts on Theatetus

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Another example of the emphasis that Plato puts on poetry is the what he sees as fundamental to knowledge, first-hand experience. Poetry cannot communicate anything if the reader does not understand the images and expressions that the poet is weaving into his verse. A reader must have first lived life and encountered the world, and then the poet can go to work on that store of experience to bring out further and new experiences for the reader. As the man who has not lived cannot feel and understand the poetic character of the world, so the man who has not lived cannot hope to know the truth of the world.

Of course, the nature of Plato’s teaching is itself poetic. Socrates cares very much for Theatetus as an individual, and cares much for Athens as his city. Such care for the particularity of the world bespeaks poetic sensibilities. Philosophy and knowledge are the products of individual encounters between people in the world, not the monologues of a sophist. Plato tells stories about philosophy; philosophy is presented within a myth. This is not to say that Plato is a mere fabulist, but it does suggest that human beings need poetry before philosophy, if for no other reason than the need for experience.

Theatetus after thoughts

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I liked my classmates’ leadership within class. Great examples of political rule, friendship, and statesmanship. You’d think everyone had just read Aristotle.

I was curious about Chris’ presentation in particular. He led us very skillfully through the arguments about knowledge and perception, making the arguments clear and employing incisive logic. I was somewhat perplexed at his conclusion, however. He interpreted Socrates description of the proper activity of the soul to be about propositions, and then claimed that Socrates was arguing for propositions to be the object of knowledge.

Now, as one whose thoughts dwell within the sublunar, I’m perhaps not very qualified to opine on these sort of questions. But what is an “object of knowledge?” Would it not, in fact, be what is know? It would be whatever the human intellect aims at, seems to me. It would be the “that for the sake of which” of human knowing.

The text (as I remember) that Chris pointed us toward was at 187a. Socrates refers to “whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things that are.” So, the soul is concerned with the things that are, that is, being. Furthermore, as Theatetus notes, what is proper to the soul is “investigating the common features of everything.” (185e) Thus the soul is engaged in making e pluribus unum. The soul is universalizing as a way to understand reality.

It seems to me that Socrates is not so concerned with propositions as he is with the ability of the soul to know reality and grasp being. He opposes the idea that knowledge is perception because (among other things) perception cannot move past the particular to the universal. If the mind cannot grasp the universal, then the task of philosophy is hopeless, pace Karl.

Not that the particular is unimportant. Socrates loves Athens in particular (143d), and knows the genealogy of Theatetus (144c). It is the mystery, perhaps honor, of man to grasp the particular and the universal.

Furthermore, I have nothing against proposition. Propositions are quite useful – it is the human mode of thinking. But the mode is not the object. If we only know propositions, than philosophy becomes a study of words rather than being. Political philosophy would be about what is said and not about the good. If that is the case, why bother?

Theatetus

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Theatetus is one of the most complex texts I’ve read. Consequently, I’m not even sure where to begin regarding interpretation of questions. I suppose the beginning is as good a place as anywhere else.

Euclides begins the dialogue by asking Terpsion if he had just arrived from the country or had been at rest for a while. Terpsion answer that he has indeed been in the city for quite some time, but had not been able to find Euclides. Euclides tells Terpsion that is because he himself had left the city to watch the arrival of Theatetus from Corinth, wounded and sick with dysentery. The theme of this first exchange is undoubtedly that of motion and rest. Terpision has been at rest in Megara for some time, and yet had been unable to find Euclides, because Euclides has been in motion and away from his home. Euclides is watching the arrival of Theatetus, a home town hero, completing his motion to rest. Unfortunately, Theatetus has dysentery, a disease of almost pure motion, and thus it is unclear whether Theatetus will survive.

The prologue continues in this theme: whenever Euclides would travel to Athens, he would ask Socrates about his conversation with Theatetus and perfect his copy of that conversation he kept in writing back in Megara. Terpsion wants to “go through” the conversation while he rests, thus bringing the ideas together (143a-b).

Within the prologue, it seems that we have a kind of foreshadowing of what will follow. Euclides has spent a good part of his life “fixing” Socrates’ conversation with Theatetus.  This attempt to make permanent seems similar to the attempt of the human mind to attain knowledge and certainty. Furthermore, the cause of Theatetus’ death reminds us that Protagoras’ theory relies on all things being in motion and that nothing rests. Theatetus’ death by dysentery is clear evidence that life relies some things resting and not being in motion.

Can we understand the prologue to be a preliminary look at the question of motion and rest? If so, what bearing do motion and rest have on knowledge? 

Poetry and philosophy

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Listening to my classmates explain their interests in an orderly fashion, and then (at least sometimes) defending their thinking was quite good. I’m glad to be in the company of such careful and disciplined thinkers.

Allie’s interest in exploring the relationship between poetry and philosophy sounds particularly important. I may be something of a biased judge in this case, since poetry and philosophy are among my favorite things. But as Aquinas writes, the poet and the philosopher are both concerned with the wondrous, and thus, on a fundamental level, philosophy and poetry are similar projects. Aquinas also says that first poets wrote about wondrous things, especially concerning the origin of the cosmos, and thus caused philosophers to philosophize. Thus, as far as Aquinas is concerned, poetry is a sort of cause of philosophy.

Aristotle notes the philosophy begins with wonder and a fear of ignorance – ignorance is a sort of pain that drives men to know and philosophize. As Shakespeare’s Paulina tells Leontes, ” I like you silence, it more shows of your wonder.” Wonder is the beginning of philosophy, yet there remains something ambiguous about it. Aristotle, Aquinas, and poets note that it is perhaps the very thing that makes human beings what they are, and yet it is tied to a sort pain which, to use a hackneyed phrase, is a part of the human condition.

I tend to think that the soul which is not touched by poetry cannot philosophize, for it cannot wonder. Poetry confronts us with reality in one way or another; even the mythic poets are attempting to articulate something about the nature of things. Poetry moves us out of quotidian life,

Wishing ever to sunder                                                                                                  Things and things’ selves for a second finding, to lose                                                      For a moment all that it touches back to wonder.

 Thus, why wouldn’t Socrates conclude with a myth? He gives Phaedo and us the beginning of philosophy.

Another set of post-Phaedo thoughts

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I was a bit confused after class about the forms that Socrates talks about. In Republic, Socrates is quite definite about the forms. They are universals also some kind of principle of existence of things. As Socrates says, all individual manifestations of some form participate in the form. They do not possess the principle of being within them. Rather, they are like emanations of some universal. But in Phaedo, Socrates is much more general and less sure of what they relation between forms and manifestations of the forms in our experience. He says that they may participate in the forms, or perhaps just “go along with the forms”. This is a much more ambiguous claim than what Socrates says in Republic. I think I can understand Socrates’ search for a universal, and furthermore his insistence that the form has to correspond to some extent with the particular manifestations of the form. I don’t understand what kind of relationship there is between the form and the existence of the individual, however. Any thoughts?

Dr. Schultz said that the form is some kind of universal experience that doesn’t necessarily give content to the manifestation of the individual. Does this mean that Socrates is not necessarily talking about the universal, or at least not talking about a universal definition? A universal experience sounds a bit like poetry to me, not that poetry is a bad thing. Rather, I normally think of poetry and philosophy as distinct ways of manifesting the experience of wonder. Perhaps there is a closer connection though.