I liked my classmates’ leadership within class. Great examples of political rule, friendship, and statesmanship. You’d think everyone had just read Aristotle.
I was curious about Chris’ presentation in particular. He led us very skillfully through the arguments about knowledge and perception, making the arguments clear and employing incisive logic. I was somewhat perplexed at his conclusion, however. He interpreted Socrates description of the proper activity of the soul to be about propositions, and then claimed that Socrates was arguing for propositions to be the object of knowledge.
Now, as one whose thoughts dwell within the sublunar, I’m perhaps not very qualified to opine on these sort of questions. But what is an “object of knowledge?” Would it not, in fact, be what is know? It would be whatever the human intellect aims at, seems to me. It would be the “that for the sake of which” of human knowing.
The text (as I remember) that Chris pointed us toward was at 187a. Socrates refers to “whatever we call that activity of the soul when it is busy by itself about the things that are.” So, the soul is concerned with the things that are, that is, being. Furthermore, as Theatetus notes, what is proper to the soul is “investigating the common features of everything.” (185e) Thus the soul is engaged in making e pluribus unum. The soul is universalizing as a way to understand reality.
It seems to me that Socrates is not so concerned with propositions as he is with the ability of the soul to know reality and grasp being. He opposes the idea that knowledge is perception because (among other things) perception cannot move past the particular to the universal. If the mind cannot grasp the universal, then the task of philosophy is hopeless, pace Karl.
Not that the particular is unimportant. Socrates loves Athens in particular (143d), and knows the genealogy of Theatetus (144c). It is the mystery, perhaps honor, of man to grasp the particular and the universal.
Furthermore, I have nothing against proposition. Propositions are quite useful – it is the human mode of thinking. But the mode is not the object. If we only know propositions, than philosophy becomes a study of words rather than being. Political philosophy would be about what is said and not about the good. If that is the case, why bother?
I very much hope that Chris responds to this; we should make sure that he reads it after he gets back from his conference this weekend. You might look at Chris’s post class blog post for this week also, as it seems important.
In the mean time:
With respect to your thought that “If the mind cannot grasp the universal, then the task of philosophy is hopeless, pace Karl.”:
I don’t think that we can by our own reason or strength grasp the universal. But we can be on the way towards doing so, like the erotic philosopher ascending (but never fully succeeding to climb, at least in this life) the ladder towards Beauty that Diotima describes.
Oh, I see. I don’t think I meant that we could grasp such things as the “beautiful” or the “good”; certainly not without help. I think I meant something much more mundane, such as
2+2=4, “magnitudes commensurable to the same magnitude are commensurable to each other” , “every activity aims at some end”, “not burned coffee is better than burned coffee.”
I just mean that we have to be able to say one thing of many, I think. Or be able to notice the existence of concepts without tying those concepts to particular things, such as the odd and the even, or being. But that’s all small fish compared to what Diotima is describing, to be sure.
Thanks for pointing me to Chris’ blog.
Another issue to consider is that Socrates is not presenting his own argument here but helping Theaetetus draw out his own argument. They are testing the argumentative waters together.
I think a certain task of philosophy is lost if we can’t grasp universals, but I don’t think that is the whole philosophical ball of wax. Philosophy is inquiry into things, including universals, as much as it is the grasping of them.
Good post.